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The Importance of the Internal Information Environment for Tax Avoidance 
 
Abstract 
We show that firms’ ability to avoid taxes is greatly affected by the quality of the firm’s 
internal information environment, with effective tax rates (ETRs) substantially lower for high 
internal information quality firms. Furthermore, we show that firms that experience an internal 
information quality improvement (reduction) are reducing (increasing) their ETRs.  The effect of 
internal information quality on tax avoidance is strongest for firms in which information is likely 
to play a more important role. First, firms with high coordination needs because of their 
dispersed geographical or business industry presence benefit more from the reduced information 
asymmetry and improved information coordination between their various business units, 
allowing for more effective tax planning. Second, firms that are operating in a more uncertain 
environment are able to offset some of the negative effect of uncertainty on their ETRs through 
the quality of their internal information system. Because lower ETRs are obtained through better 
internal information quality, they do not come at the cost of increased risk in the tax positions 
taken: unrecognized tax benefits and ETR volatility are lower in high quality information 
environments.  
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We investigate the role the quality of the internal information environment plays in firms’ 
ability to avoid taxes. Prior literature has studied firm-level characteristics such as firm size, 
profitability, leverage, capital intensity, foreign operations, and R&D expenses (e.g. Cheng, 
Huang, Li, and Stanfield, 2012; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Rego, 2003) that can help explain 
variation in the level of tax avoidance (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008), but a significant 
proportion has remained unexplained. Increasingly, researchers have understood that we need to 
dig deeper inside the firm to obtain a better understanding of the tax planning processes and 
decisions that lead to the observable tax avoidance outcomes. For example, Shackelford and 
Shevlin (2001) call for developing bridges between tax and managerial accounting, arguing that 
tax, as an internal function of the organization, fits naturally with questions that interest 
managerial accounting researchers. More than a decade later, Hanlon (2012) suggests that more 
connections still need to be made between tax and management accounting. 
In this paper, we will argue that in order to understand tax avoidance outcomes, it is 
necessary to consider the role the quality of the internal information environment of the firm 
plays in supporting tax planning decision making that can result in such outcomes.
1
 We define 
quality of the internal information environment (hereafter IIQ) in terms of the accessibility, 
usefulness, reliability, accuracy, quantity, and signal to noise ratio of the data and knowledge 
collected, generated, and consumed within an organization. High quality management 
accounting systems will allow a firm to obtain a high quality internal information environment. 
This aspect of the internal firm environment has so far mostly been ignored in the tax avoidance 
literature, yet seems crucial to the firm’s ability to avoid taxes.
2
 Without good information, tax 
planning opportunities may not be visible, coordination of tax planning across business or 
                                                          
1
 Readers with a management accounting background will recognize ”decision making” as one of the two pillars of 
management accounting practice, the other pillar being “performance management and control.” Recent studies have 
looked at the interaction between tax avoidance and performance management and control, finding associations 
between measures of tax aggressiveness and the use of after-tax performance measures for business unit managers 
(Phillips, 2003), the value of stock option grants to the 5 highest paid executives (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006), the 
choice to evaluate corporate tax departments as profit centers as opposed to cost centers (Robinson, Sikes, and 
Weaver, 2010), tax director compensation (Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker, 2012) and equity risk incentives (Rego 
and Wilson, 2012). The literature on the decision making aspect is much more limited, and Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010) have called for more research on tax decision making within the firm, specifically regarding tax avoidance. 
2
 A notable exception is Bauer (2011) who finds that firms with a tax-related internal control weakness have on 
average 4% higher Cash ETRs. While Bauer (2011) focuses on how tax-related internal control weaknesses can 
provide relevant information to outside investors,  we will argue that material weaknesses in internal control 
(irrespective of what they relate to) constitute (only) one specific aspect of the overall internal information 
environment that supports decision making by managers. 
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geographic segments may be difficult or even impossible, risk taken in pursuing aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies may be very high and the firm’s documentation may not constitute 
acceptable proof vis-à-vis the IRS. For example, Bayer predicts that it will take several years to 
sort through documentation problems related to sustain R&D tax credits with the IRS dating 
back to 1998, since their accounting system cannot readily provide the required information 
(McKinnon, 2012). Furthermore, it is well known that globally coordinated transfer pricing 
schemes can allow multinational firms to avoid a substantial amount of taxes. However, Ernst & 
Young’s recent transfer pricing survey indicates that still only 41% of multinationals prepared 
transfer pricing documentation concurrently on a globally coordinated basis. The other 59 
percent either prepared documentation for a single country (modifying to the needs of other 
jurisdictions as needed), prepared it on an as-necessary country-by-country basis with limited 
coordination between countries, or did not even prepare any transfer pricing documentation at all 
(Ernst and Young, 2010).
3
 The lack of information coordination in the majority of multinationals 
likely has a profound impact on their ability to avoid taxes. 
 In sum, understanding the quality of a firm’s internal information environment is of major 
importance in explaining a firm’s ability to avoid taxes and the risk the firm incurs when 
pursuing aggressive tax strategies. We will show the channels through which such IIQ has an 
effect on the efficacy of tax decision making, resulting in tax avoidance. In doing so, we 
explicate the importance of managerial accounting for tax accounting and respond to Maydew 
(2001)’s call to put information and uncertainty front and center when researching this particular 
taxation issue. 
We use five publicly available proxies of the quality of firm’s internal information 
environment: the speed by which management is able to bring out an earnings announcement 
after fiscal year closing, management forecast accuracy, the absence of material weaknesses in 
internal control, analyst following, and analyst forecast accuracy. While IIQ is by definition 
private to the firm and unobservable, we argue in Section 3 that these five measures capture this 
construct. We show that our results hold across the variety of these measures and with the 
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 Rossing and Rohde (2010) report on a case study where a large multinational firm thoroughly changed its 
managerial cost allocation system so that it could support the firm’s transfer pricing compliance strategy. 
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different cross-sectional predictions. We believe that the totality of our results validate our 
measures, and suggest that they can be used in further studies to serve as proxies for IIQ.
4
  
Our findings demonstrate the important role IIQ plays in understanding tax planning 
decision making and its outcome, tax avoidance. We show that moving one quintile in our 
continuous measures is associated with a cash effective tax rate (Cash ETR) reduction of 
approximately 1 percent, and moving from the bottom quintile to the top quintile of our 
continuous measures is associated with reductions in Cash ETR ranging from 2.2 to 4.1 percent. 
Having a section 404 material weakness is associated with an increase in Cash ETR of 5.1 
percent. This levels result extends to a change analysis, where we show that firms that 
experience a change in IIQ also change their degree of tax avoidance.
5
   
Next, we investigate cross-sectional differences in the effect of IIQ on tax avoidance that 
help us understand through which mechanisms IIQ plays a role for achieving tax avoidance 
outcomes. First, we expect that IIQ is more important in firms with greater coordination needs 
because of their more dispersed geographical or business industry presence. Such firms benefit 
more from IIQ through reduced information asymmetry and improved information coordination 
between their various business units, allowing for more effective tax planning. We document that 
while both geographic and business industry segment dispersion indeed make tax avoidance 
more difficult, this effect is largely offset by improved IIQ. Second, we predict and find that 
operating in more uncertain environments (using the presence of restructuring charges and sales 
volatility as proxies for uncertainty) makes tax planning for firms more problematic. Tax 
opportunities may not be visible, there may be substantial doubts about the payoffs of particular 
tax planning opportunities, and forecasting over the wide range of potential tax outcomes may be 
difficult. We show that firms are able to offset some of the negative effects of such uncertainty 
on tax avoidance through the quality of their internal information system. 
                                                          
4
 As we will describe more fully later, management accounting researchers have typically needed to resort to 
creative use of (large scale) simulations or (small scale) proprietary data collection to overcome the unobservability 
issue. Our proxies allow for large scale, publicly observable, real life data, at the expense of weaker construct 
validity. 
5
 Prior research has suggested that managers value both cash flows and book earnings when making tax planning 
decisions (Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin, 2011; Shackelford, Slemrod, and Sallee, 2011). While our main analyses 
use the firm’s cash effective tax rate as the empirical proxy for tax avoidance, we document that our findings are 
robust to employing the firm’s book effective tax rate (GAAP ETR). Thus, our results indicate that having better IIQ 
allows the firm to engage in more tax avoidance for both cash flow and book purposes. 
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 Finally, we examine the effect of IIQ on tax risk. We define tax risk as the amount of 
uncertainty experienced by the corporate tax payer that is caused by the possibility of changes in 
its tax liability when its tax filings are not upheld by the tax authorities, and by the 
unpredictability thereof.
6
 Firms with greater tax risk are likely to reserve more for their tax 
positions ex ante, and experience more volatility in tax outcomes ex post. Thus, we use two 
measures of tax risk, one that captures budgeted tax risk at the time of the tax planning decisions, 
while the other indicates actual outcome tax risk. Reinforcing that the lower ETRs we document 
are obtained because of better IIQ that supports improved tax planning decision-making, we 
show that the increased tax avoidance outcome observed in high IIQ firms is not coming at the 
cost of higher tax risk.  First, we use UTB as a measure of budgeted (planned) tax risk assumed 
at the time the tax positions are taken (Rego and Wilson, 2012).
7
 While higher IIQ reduces 
ETRs, we find that it is not positively associated with UTB, and with some of our proxies of IIQ 
we even document that higher IIQ is accompanied with significantly lower UTB. Second, we use 
cash ETR volatility over five years as a measure of tax outcome (ex post) risk (Guenther, 
Matsunaga, and Williams, 2012). ETR volatility is disliked by firms, tax consultants and tax 
directors alike (Ernst & Young, 2011). We document that a high quality internal information 
environment helps achieve these objectives through reducing the riskiness of tax avoidance 
outcomes over time: ETR volatility is substantially lower in high quality information 
environments. 
Hence, increased tax avoidance (as defined by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) as the reduction 
of explicit taxes) can go hand in hand with decreased budgeted and outcome tax risk if the firm 
has high IIQ. This result sheds new light on the difficulty of conceptually defining tax avoidance 
or tax aggressiveness and the notion that such degree of aggressiveness is in the eye of the 
beholder (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Referring  to the model by Mills, Robinson, and Sansing 
(2010), both Frischmann, Shevlin, and Wilson (2008) and Rego and Wilson (2012) define 
aggressive tax reporting as engaging in significant tax positions with relatively weak supporting 
facts. Hence, in order to understand that what is aggressive for one firm may not be aggressive 
for another firm, we need to understand the quality of the internal information on which tax 
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 We do not study tax risk that results from the incompleteness of the tax law, and its many legislative, 
administrative, and judicial modifications (Blouin, Devereux, and Shackelford, 2012). 
7
 Unrecognized tax benefits need to be reported for the largest amount of a tax benefit taken on the tax return that is 





 Our results suggest that when a firm has strong facts to support a tax 
planning strategy, they are not taking on more risk or behaving more aggressively when reducing 
ETR. 
Of course, it is likely that there are certain characteristics of the firm that lead to both higher 
quality internal information and more tax avoidance opportunities. Furthermore, both IIQ and tax 
avoidance are choices of the firm, suggesting that endogeneity may be a concern. We conduct a 
battery of additional tests that we believe rule out correlated omitted variables and endogeneity 
as potential explanations for our results. In brief, we use an extensive set of carefully chosen 
control variables and industry fixed effects, we present consistent evidence with both a first 
difference and a lead-lag specification, and we report an analysis of the shock caused by the 
imposition of Sarbanes-Oxley on low IIQ firms. Furthermore, we show our results are robust to 
employing a long-run specification and additional control variables. 
By examining the role of the firm’s IIQ, our study helps to shed light on the black box of tax 
avoidance, which is of interest to academics, tax authorities, and practitioners. We document that 
IIQ is strongly related to the ability to engage in effective tax planning through (1) coordination 
via information dissemination, (2) resolution of uncertainty by means of information acquisition 
and (3) reduction of budgeted and actual tax risk. Furthermore, understanding the link between 
tax avoidance and the quality of the information on which tax planning decisions are based is 
essential to understanding what it means to be tax aggressive. For example, two firms with 
differing IIQ may be able to achieve the identical low effective tax rate. However, if the firm 
with high IIQ is better able to identify tax avoidance opportunities through increased information 
acquisition and dissemination and is more competent at carefully documenting its tax positions, 
whereas the low IIQ firm has to rely on tax shelters with little economic substance, then the firm 
with better IIQ has achieved its low tax rate with considerably less tax risk. This suggests that 
academics need to consider IIQ when studying tax aggressiveness. Furthermore, faced with the 
choice to allocate costly auditing resources to one of two firms with the same ETR, tax 
authorities are more likely to identify unsustainable tax positions in the firm with an internal 
information environment of low quality.
9
 Additionally, tax practitioners can emphasize the 
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 Note that neither Frischmann et al. (2008) nor Rego and Wilson (2012) control for the quality of information in 
their analyses. 
9
 The tax authority is less likely to be able to overturn a tax position that was taken based on high IIQ. Moreover, 
Zhigang (2010) argues that the amount of visible audit cues is reduced when a firm has  integrated their tax 
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importance of management accounting systems that improve IIQ for effective tax avoidance. 
Finally, our findings demonstrate the importance of building bridges between managerial 
accounting and taxation research and practice.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 elaborates on the IIQ proxies we use. In Section 4 we 
discuss research design, sample, and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the results of the 
study. Section 6 reports on endogeneity tests and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes and 
presents avenues for future research. 
 
2. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Quality of the internal information environment 
 The management accounting literature has long since argued that a high quality internal 
information environment will lead to improved managerial decision making (Horngren, Datar, 
Foster, Rajan, and Ittner, 2012). High quality management accounting systems such as enterprise 
systems can positively impact IIQ by providing management with real-time information 
concerning the financial condition of the company and eliminating barriers between accounting 
cycles (Brazel and Dang, 2008). This allows managers unprecedented access to accounting 
information. Information can be improved through centralized and standardized business 
transaction processing, reduction of reporting cycle times, and integration of data across business 
units and geographical locations. All of this will result in greater and timelier access to more 
accurate information and enhanced internal transparency. Both information acquisition (the task 
of finding information) and information integration (the task of assessing informational impact) 
will be improved (Hodge, Kennedy, and Mains, 2004).
10
 
While improved managerial accounting systems are likely to have a positive impact on any 
managerial decision making, our focus here is on its effect of IIQ on enhancing the quality of tax 
planning decision making, with tax avoidance as a desirable outcome. We argue that a firm’s 
ability to effectively plan taxes is improved by an internal information environment that makes 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reporting in their overall ERP system, since there no longer is a paper trail for automated processes such as customer 
orders, purchase orders, and electronic payments.  
10
 We acknowledge that managerial ability in information processing and analyzing will also play a role in the 
quality of the decision making outcomes achieved. We look forward to future papers that open this part of the black 
box of tax decision making. An important step in this direction was taken by Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010). 
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both information acquisition and integration easier.
11
 Information necessary for the tax function 
is typically decentralized and buried within systems tailored for financial and management 
reporting (Cranford, Murias, and Schutzman, 2012). Documentation and collection of 
information from disparate systems to support tax compliance can be incredibly time consuming. 
Tax consultants are quoted to say that many firms pass on tax breaks that they are entitled to 
claim because the compliance and documentation costs are too high (as mentioned in the Bayer 
example above) (McKinnon, 2012). Similarly, Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) argue that 
firms have tax planning opportunities around property, plant, and equipment, such as the 
decision of whether to buy or lease buildings and equipment and the timing of asset acquisitions 
and disposals, but that compliance and record keeping costs to achieve these opportunities are 
high (e.g. keeping track of depreciation method and cost for each fixed asset, and the use of 
different depreciation methods for regular and AMT tax). However, in a high internal 
information quality environment, tax compliance processes can be dealt with quickly and 
effectively, so that the tax department’s resources can be freed up and allocated to pursuing tax 
planning opportunities. As a result, the firm will be able to avoid more taxes, which leads to our 
first hypothesis: 
H1: As the quality of the internal information environment of the firm increases, tax 
avoidance increases.  
 
2.2 Coordination needs 
Decentralization usually means that there is more specific information available at a 
decentralized level (with business units and/or lower level managers), but that this information is 
not necessarily available to corporate management, and hence substantial information asymmetry 
may exists. While business units operating in different lines of business or geographic locations 
are less likely to interact (Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith, 1995) and may hence have specific 
information available only to their own units, the tax function is an administrative function with 
responsibilities that permeate the entire firm. Regardless of how decentralized firms are, in most 
firms the tax department operates at the corporate level (Robinson et al., 2010). High dispersion 
                                                          
11
 In an interesting paper, Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay (2011) find that tax aggressiveness reduces firm 
transparency (that is, the quality of the external information environment), presumably due to the complexity of 
activities specifically designed to avoid taxes. Conversely, we look at how the quality of the internal information 
makes tax planning opportunities visible. 
9 
 
of business units makes the coordination across those business units for tax planning difficult 
since each of those business units may prepare tax returns in several jurisdictions. 
Existing survey evidence speaks to the perceived usefulness of improved information in the 
context of decentralization. Chenhall and Morris (1986) provide evidence that the usefulness of 
scope, aggregation, and integration of information is higher when there is decentralization and 
organizational interdependence. Chapman and Kihn (2009) show that managers’ perceptions of 
enterprise systems success are a function of the extent of organizational integration created by 
the implementation of such systems, and that management’s confidence in their internal 
information results from the improved integration of information across disparate business 
units.
12
 Viewing the tax department as a business unit that has specific private information, 
Robinson et al. (2010) discuss how organizing it as a profit center allows to solve the agency 
problem asymmetric information creates, by encouraging the department to consider overall firm 
performance. They find that tax departments that are organized as profit centers achieve lower 
book effective tax rates. An alternative way to overcome information asymmetry issues created 
by decentralization is to improve the internal information environment of the firm. This reduces 
information asymmetries between various business units, and between the corporate tax 
department and business units. Tax avoidance requires a lot of information and documentation 
coordination across business units to be effective, so we expect to see the largest effect of the 
quality of the internal information environment on tax avoidance in firms with high coordination 
needs. 
High geographic and business industry dispersion also typifies firms with a lot of tax 
planning opportunities, yet also high compliance costs. Inter-jurisdictional income shifting for 
geographically dispersed firms can result in significant tax savings (Maydew, 2001), and Mills et 
al. (1998) document that such firms invest more in tax planning. Business industry dispersion 
may increase opportunities for tax avoidance through transfer pricing opportunities in the supply 
chain. However, documentation vis-à-vis tax authorities has to be maintained at all points in such 
a process. Improved coordination of information is likely to make such tax avoidance 
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 Note that existing evidence on the effects of improved information quality in management accounting (e.g. on 
adoption of Activity-Based Costing systems) typically looks at perceived outcomes. Few papers look at whether 




opportunities visible and reduce the cost of compliance. Both arguments lead us to our second 
hypothesis: 
H2a: As a firm’s coordination needs increase, tax avoidance decreases. 
H2b: Higher internal information quality acts as an offset to the negative effect of a firm’s 
coordination needs on tax avoidance. 
 
2.3 Uncertainty 
The basic effect of uncertainty is to limit the ability of managers of an organization to 
preplan or to make decisions about activities in advance of their execution. Uncertainty hence is 
likely to diminish a firm’s tax planning ability, since tax opportunities may not be visible, there 
may be substantial doubts about the payoffs of particular tax avoidance opportunities, and 
forecasting over the wide range of potential tax outcomes may be difficult. Scotchmer and 
Slemrod (1989)’s model predicts that in an environment where there is a lot of uncertainty about 
the tax liability, firms will pay a higher amount of taxes to reduce the probability that a fine will 
be assessed. Consistent with the notion that uncertainty reduces tax avoidance, McGuire, Omer, 
and Wilde (2012) empirically find that firms working in an environment characterized by high 
operating uncertainty are less likely to engage in tax shelters.  
Information economics has long since shown that uncertainty can be resolved by acquiring 
information. Early work by Galbraith (1974) indicates that with greater uncertainty, a greater 
amount of information must be processed among decision makers during task execution in order 
to achieve a given level of performance. One of the strategies Galbraith suggests to deal with 
uncertainty, so that firms can increase their ability to preplan, is increasing their capacity to 
process information by investing in information systems. Chenhall and Morris (1986) present 
survey evidence indicating that uncertainty makes planning more difficult and that the perceived 
usefulness of scope, timeliness, and various levels of aggregation of information is higher in 
uncertain environments. 
While from an information economics perspective it is obvious that information plays a 
larger role in uncertain environments, surprisingly little tax accounting research has looked at 





 A notable exception is Beck, Davis, and Jung (1996) who, in an experiment, find that 
subjects that are exposed to more uncertainty about their tax liability are more likely to purchase 
advice of experts that possess information that can resolve this uncertainty. Information should 
be able to offset some of the negative effect of uncertainty on tax avoidance. This leads us to the 
following set of hypotheses: 
H3a: As uncertainty increases, tax avoidance decreases. 
H3b: Higher internal information quality acts as an offset to the negative effect of 
uncertainty on tax avoidance. 
 
2.4 Tax risk 
In their review paper, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) discuss the difficulty of conceptually 
defining tax avoidance or tax aggressiveness and the notion that the degree of aggressiveness is 
in the eye of the beholder.
14
 We contend that it is crucial to import the notions of risk assumed by 
and information available to the firm during the tax planning decision in this discussion. To see 
this, imagine two firms (A and B) who both achieve a low ETR of 15 percent (the tax outcome 
variable). Firm A can achieve such low ETR by relying on high quality information to support its 
decision making and its documentation vis-à-vis the taxation authorities, and assumes very little 
risk in the tax positions it takes. Firm B is only able to achieve this low ETR by pursuing very 
risky tax avoidance opportunities since it does not have access to good information and has little 
ability to convincingly document these strategies. The likelihood that Firm B’s tax avoidance 
choices will be disallowed by the taxation authorities is high. Thus, Firm B’s tax risk is high. 
Hence, we would argue that Firm B is much more tax aggressive than Firm A. 
Some empirical papers have incorporated this notion that the quality of information is 
important in defining tax aggressiveness. Referring back to the model by Mills et al. (2010), both 
Frischmann et al. (2008) and Rego and Wilson (2012) define aggressive (or risky) tax reporting 
as engaging in significant tax positions with relatively weak supporting facts.
15
 We follow Rego 
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 Note that the economics literature has studied uncertainty around taxation, but their focus is typically not on the 
role of information provision to resolve uncertainty within firms. Rather, they discuss the uncertainty created by 
governmental changes in tax policy. 
14
 Also practitioners have called for the need to agree on an acceptable definition of what constitutes aggressive tax 
planning in order to adopt “enlightened” tax risk management programs (Klotsche and Traubenberg, 2010). 
15
 One of the predictions in Mills et al. (2010) is that those firms with “strong facts” are better off post FIN48 as they 
now can use this mandatory disclosure mechanism to credibly communicate that they have low uncertainty on their 
tax positions, and achieve a higher expected payoff as a result. However, note that they do not model a cross-
12 
 
and Wilson (2012) who argue that unrecognized tax benefits (UTB) are the best proxy for the 
concept of “risky tax avoidance.” UTB need to be reported for the largest amount of tax benefit 
taken on the tax return that is judged more likely than not to not be upheld by the IRS. Hence, we 
use UTB as a measure of budgeted (planned) tax risk assumed at the time the tax positions are 
taken. 
Firms with a higher quality internal information environment have better information to 
support their tax planning decision making, higher confidence in their information endowment 
(Chenhall, 2008) and better documentation ability vis-à-vis taxation authorities. All of these 
affect both the level of tax avoidance and the risk assumed in pursuing those tax avoidance 
opportunities. Since we argued in hypothesis 1 that higher quality information will increase tax 
avoidance opportunities, there are three scenarios that could possibly materialize: (1) firms 
increased tax avoidance while assuming less risk, (2) firms kept their risk profile the same, or (3) 
firms increased the risk assumed. Since high IIQ allows for better documentation with regards to 
the taxing authority, it reduces the risk that any given tax position will be overturned upon audit. 
Furthermore, we have no reason to think that high IIQ firms would typically be more risk 
seeking than other firms; in fact, the opposite is likely to be the case. Hence, such firms may well 
be in a position to make effective tax planning decisions (as hypothesized in H1) without 
needing to assume high levels of risk.
16
 This leads us to our fourth hypothesis: 
H4: As the quality of the internal information environment of the firm increases, budgeted 
tax risk assumed decreases. 
While we have argued that UTB is a measure of the riskiness assumed at the time of making 
a tax planning decision (or the budgeted amount of risk), another important aspect of the 
riskiness of the tax position lies in the tax outcome risk (the actual amount of risk). We use 5-
year ETR volatility as a measure of such tax outcome risk (Guenther et al., 2012; McGuire, 
Neuman, and Omer, 2011). Firms dislike ETR volatility, and typically feel the need to explain 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sectional variation on the quality of information available to firms (all firms are modeled to have perfect internal 
information). The cross-sectional variation on the “strong facts” parameter refers to the level of the expected tax 
benefits being high versus low. 
16
 As discussed by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), UTB is a self-reported measure around which the firm can have 
strategic reporting incentives, which may make its interpretation not as clear-cut. Underreporting of UTB, which 
there may well be for strategic reasons that involve keeping the asymmetry of information between the IRS and the 
firm as high as possible, decreases our measure of risk. However, we cannot think of a reason why those with better 
information would underreport more than those with worse information, so potential underreporting should not bias 
in favor of our result. 
13 
 
high ETR volatility extensively in their communications with investors.
17
 A recent Ernst & 
Young whitepaper states “[t]he market expects improved management of tax risks, together with 
increased controls and faster reporting times with no surprises” (Ernst & Young, 2011). CFOs 
say that fluctuations in ETR drive down firms’ earnings quality (Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal, 2012). Tax consultants discuss ETR volatility as an important statistic to be used in 
benchmarking (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2012). Tax directors want to be able to stand in front 
of their board with the confidence that tax is under control and that there is no risk of meaningful 
surprises (Viglione and Norton, 2009). They dislike any unpredictability caused by potentially 
overturned positions. Just as the amount of risk assumed at the time of making the tax planning 
decision is likely to be lower in a high quality information environment, the amount of risk 
actually incurred should also be lower. Furthermore, better internal information allows the firm 
to find more long term tax avoidance opportunities with recurring benefits rather than 
necessitating it to run after one-time opportunities (Mills et al., 1998), resulting in low variation 
of ETR over the years.
18
 Both reasons lead us to our fifth hypothesis: 
H5: As the quality of the internal information environment of the firm increases, actual 
outcome tax risk decreases. 
 
3. INTERNAL INFORMATION QUALITY PROXIES 
Managerial accounting research has often struggled with the unavailability of a good proxy 
for the quality of the internal information environment. As mentioned earlier, a firm’s internal 
information is by definition private to the firm and in particular the quality of management 
accounting systems is typically not publically observable. Also, while theoretical models often 
assume that perfect information is available to the firm, such benchmark against which to assess 
the quality of any given information system is empirically not obtainable. Hence, an absolute 
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 For example, Synaptics wrote in their 2012 10-K: “The calculation of tax liabilities involves significant judgment 
in estimating the impact of uncertainties in the application of highly complex tax laws. Resolution of these 
uncertainties in a manner inconsistent with our expectations could have a material impact on our consolidated 
financial position, result of operations, or cash flows. We believe we have adequately provided for reasonably 
foreseeable outcomes in connection with the resolution of income tax uncertainties. However, our results have in the 
past, and could in the future, include favorable and unfavorable adjustments to our estimated tax liabilities in the 
period a determination of such estimated tax liability is made or resolved, upon the filing of an amended return, 
upon a change in facts, circumstances, or interpretation, or upon the expiration of a statute of limitation. 
Accordingly, our effective tax rate could fluctuate materially from period to period. […] As a result, our future 
quarterly and annual effective tax rates will be subject to greater volatility.” 
18
 Note that we look at the second moment of ETR over 5 years, which is different from Dyreng et al. (2008) who 
look at average ETR over a longer period (the first moment). 
14 
 
measure of IIQ is impossible to calculate. Out of necessity, management accounting researchers 
have resorted to survey methods to measure the (perceived) quality of management accounting 
systems (e.g. Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Ittner, Lanen, and Larcker, 2002; Maiga and Jacobs, 
2008) or used simulation methods that make such perfect information benchmark observable 
(e.g. Balakrishnan, Hansen, and Labro, 2011; Labro and Vanhoucke, 2007). Only few papers 
have used publically available data to proxy for the quality of the internal information 
environment. Notable exceptions are Feng, Li, and McVay (2009) who use disclosures on 
material weaknesses in internal control as a proxy for low quality of the internal information 
environment and Jennings, Stoumbos, and Tanlu (2012) who use the number of days between the 
end of the quarter and the earnings announcements, whereby a shorter time span proxies for the 
existence of better quality internal information. 
In this study we employ five proxies for the quality of the internal information environment 
of the firm that are all publically observable and available in large datasets (at least in 
comparison to the size of datasets with which managerial accounting researchers typically 
work).
19
 Working with publicly available proxies allows us to examine the effect of IIQ on tax 
avoidance in a large sample and over a long period. Our five proxies are the time lag between the 
end of the fiscal year and the earnings announcement date, management forecast accuracy, 
material weaknesses in controls, and two characteristics of the analyst information environment 
(analyst following and analyst forecast accuracy). We discuss each proxy below. 
First, we follow Jennings et al. (2012) who capture the sophistication of internal accounting 
systems by counting the number of days between the end of the quarter and the earnings 
announcement date.
20
 They argue that a high quality accounting system that is capable of 
integrating information from different parts of an organization allows for the books to be closed 
more quickly than its low IIQ counterpart, where information from the various subsidiaries needs 
to be manually combined in ad hoc spreadsheets. Hence, a shorter time lag between the quarter-
end and earnings announcement can be achieved in a high IIQ environment. Additionally to this 
information coordination aspect which Jennings et al. (2012) explain, increased accuracy caused 
by eliminating manual intervention, reducing redundancy and rework, and streamlined reporting 
                                                          
19
 While the advantage of using publicly available proxies is that sample size and generalizability are increased and 
data availability is not a concern, moving away from privately collected (e.g. through surveys or case studies) data to 
define proxies comes with the drawback of capturing the construct of internal information quality with less 
precision. 
20
 We use end of the fiscal year instead of end of the quarter since we employ annual tax data. 
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should also reduce such time lag. Further, firms that have an automated financial closing process 
in place have typically received help from professionals in installing this, and will have been 
advised on how to improve their information acquisition processes. In a series of interviews, 
CFOs from companies around the globe commented on how a quick financial close meant that 
their firms also had the ability to deliver management information more quickly and more 
accurately (CFOResearchServices, 2010). Related, Brazel and Dang (2008) find that after firms 
implement ERP systems, they experience a reduction in the time difference between the firms’ 
earnings announcement dates and their fiscal year end. 
Second, we include management forecast accuracy. It has long since been established that 
management has incentives to forecast accurately (Williams, 1996). However, in order to be able 
to provide an accurate management forecast, managers must have access to good quality internal 
information (Jennings et al., 2012). Using hand collected data from news releases of firms that 
implemented improvements to their information systems, Dorantes, Li, Peters, and Richardson 
(2012, forthcoming) show that these firms increased management forecast accuracy after such 
implementation. They provide corroborating evidence that such improvement is caused by an 
improvement of the quality of the internal information system, and not by the enhanced ability of 
managers to manage earnings.
21
 Using survey data of small privately held firms, Cassar and 
Gibson (2008) establish that if such firms have internal accounting reporting and budgeting 
processes in place, they make more accurate revenue forecasts. It follows that empirical evidence 
indicates that the quality of the internal information environment must be positively correlated 
with management forecast accuracy.
22
 Also, we are not aware of any research that suggests any 
(possibly strategic) reasons why the correlation would be negative. Indeed, ceteris paribus, it is 
hard to imagine any strategic reasons for a firm with high IIQ to deliberately disclose a very 
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 Related, Gong, Li, and Xie (2009) document that common errors in management forecasts and accruals are caused 
by errors in the private information available to the managers in the firm. 
22
 Predictions from theoretical models indicate a positive correlation between the precision of private information 
and the likelihood of disclosure. In a setting where the markets knows that the manager of the firm is endowed with 
private information but where there is a proprietary cost to disclosing this information, Verrecchia (1990) predicts 
that as the private information of the manager becomes more precise, the threshold level of disclosure decreases and 
the probability of disclosure increases. To our knowledge, there are no theoretical models that link the precision of 
private information to the precision of the disclosure (management forecast). For example, information endowment 
models such as Jung and Kwon (1988) typically assume there is either no private information (infinite imprecision) 
or perfect private information, and the disclosure decision is a binary one (yes or no disclosure). Further, Verrecchia 
(1990) argues that it is not clear that binary information endowment models can be interpreted as providing a 
measure of the quality of the information environment. In their review paper Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) 




inaccurate earnings forecast or, conversely, a firm with poor IIQ having the ability to make a 
very accurate earnings forecast.
23
 
Third, following Feng et al. (2009), we use the presence of a material weakness in internal 
controls reported under Section 404 as a proxy for the lack of IIQ. They argue that some material 
weaknesses are likely to result in erroneous internal management reports that are unlikely to be 
detected since they are not audited. Also, these material weaknesses are likely resulting in 
untimely and stale financial reporting information. Furthermore, business unit information may 
not be timely and accurately reported to headquarters.
24
 Consistent with the assumed correlation 
with our second proxy, Feng et al. (2009) and Li, Peters, Richardson, and Weidenmier (2012) 
find that firms with material weaknesses in internal controls provide less accurate management 
forecasts. Using hand collected data from Lexis-Nexis news releases of firms that implemented 
(specific) internal control monitoring information technology, Masli, Peters, Richardson, and 
Sanchez (2010) show that after such implementation the likelihood of a material weakness 
decreases. Their results are stronger for firms that embed such improved information technology 
within the larger enterprise wide information environment (the more general internal information 
environment). Also, Morris (2011) shows that firms implementing ERP systems (which 
improves the quality of the information within the firm) are less likely to report a material 
weakness. Finally, material weakness disclosures typically trigger big investments in accounting 
systems, supporting in particular our changes analyses where after the resolution of a material 
weakness the firm’s environment will be improved (Chasan, 2012). 
Lastly, we use IIQ proxies based on the analysts’ information environment: analyst 
following and analyst forecast accuracy. More analyst following and better analyst forecast 
accuracy generally are indicative of a better external information environment, whereas the delay 
between the end of the quarter and the earnings announcement, the accuracy of management 
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 We are only able to observe the accuracy of the management forecast for those firms that issue guidance. If 
managers issue guidance only if the quality of their disclosure is sufficiently high, this should reduce variation in our 
management forecast accuracy measure, thereby reducing the power of our tests. 
24
 For example, Corporate Resource Services reports in its 2010 10-K filing that a “material weakness resulted from 
a lack of sufficient and effective supervisory review over the preparation and reconciliation of certain general ledger 
account balances to their underlying source documents at one of our subsidiaries” and that as part of the remediation 
of this weakness they will “develop or address, depending on the circumstances, detailed financial reporting 
procedures to ensure that each subsidiary provides timely, complete and accurate information to the Company's 
headquarters for the preparation of financial reports which include all necessary disclosures.” For further examples 
on how material weaknesses impact the quality of the firm’s internal information environment, please refer to Feng 
et al. (2009). 
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forecasts, and the existence of a material weakness in internal control are much more clearly 
linked to the quality of the internal information environment, which we are trying to capture. 
However, we argue that the internal and external information environments of the firm are 
intricately and tightly linked (Dichev et al., 2012; Hemmer and Labro, 2008). Prior literature 
suggests that there may be a positive correlation between our analyst variables and the quality of 
the internal information environment. Much of the information analysts use is directly provided 
by the firm (Lang and Lundholm, 1996), hence the quality of the internal information 
environment should be positively correlated with the quality of the analysts’ information 
environment. Indeed, Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that analysts prefer to follow firms with 
an enhanced information environment and analyst forecast error is smaller for these firms. 
Stoumbos and Tanlu (2009) conjecture that a larger analyst following signals a greater likelihood 
that managers are endowed with information and that the quantity of information production by 
managers is larger. If analysts are able to obtain enough information about a firm to prepare 
analyst reports and make recommendations, then it is likely that managers have access to more 
and better information about the firms they manage, especially in the time period after 
Regulation Fair Disclosure where the internal and external information environments are more 
alike. Indeed, the analyst’s decision to initiate coverage is linked to his ability to generate precise 
information (Beyer et al., 2010). Consistent with the notion that higher quality internal 
information is a prerequisite to higher quality of analyst information, research has shown that as 
the number of conference calls increases analyst forecast error decreases (Bowen, Davis, and 
Matsumoto, 2002), and that analyst following increases after company presentations (Francis, 
Hanna, and Philbrick, 1997). Dorantes et al. (2012, forthcoming) find that firms that are 
implementing ERP systems (arguably an improvement to their internal information environment) 
have a larger analyst following.  
Thus, extant literature suggests a positive correlation between our analyst variables and the 
quality of the internal information environment. Furthermore, to our knowledge, no research 
points to the opposite, and argues a negative correlation.
25
 While the analyst literature has 
established that analysts may not always embrace accuracy in their forecasts as their overruling 
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 The feedback  effect literature (e.g. Luo (2005)) suggests that the insiders to the firm sometimes learn from 
information produced by outsiders (e.g. analysts). While the temporal assumption in this literature may be different 
from what we described above, also this literature still implies a positive correlation between the qualities of the 
analysts’ and internal information environments. 
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objective and documents specific biases, there is no (strategic) reason to expect that such 
inaccuracy would be larger for firms with high quality internal information and/or smaller for 
firms with low quality internal information. Further, in line with existing literature,  the 
correlation patterns between all proxies for the quality of the internal information environment 
reported in table 1 indicates that they are all positively correlated, with the highest correlations 
between analyst forecast accuracy and analyst following on the one hand, and management 
forecast accuracy and speediness of the earnings announcement on the other hand.
26
 The 
advantage of including the analyst variables as part of our larger set of proxies is that they are 
available for a much larger sample than management forecasts and material weaknesses, helping 
us overcome the stumbling block of finding large scale publically available proxies for IIQ. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN, SAMPLE, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1 Research Design 
We employ the following regression specification to test our hypotheses: 
                      
                                         
                                                                           
 
In testing hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, we use the firm’s annual cash effective tax rate (Cash 
ETR) as our tax avoidance proxy, where Cash ETR is defined as the firm’s cash taxes paid 
divided by the adjusted pre-tax income (pre-tax income minus special items). For hypothesis 4, 
we employ the firm’s unrecognized tax benefit (UTB), which is measured as the average UTB 
over the year scaled by average total assets. Finally, to test hypothesis 5 we use as the tax 
avoidance proxy the 5-year volatility of the annual cash effective tax rate (Cash ETR Volatility), 
which is the standard deviation of Cash ETR over the current 5-year period.  
We use Cash ETR as our primary measure of tax avoidance in order to avoid any 
mechanical relations between our tax avoidance proxy and our IIQ proxies, some of which are 
associated with accounting earnings (such as management forecast accuracy and analyst forecast 
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 For example, positive correlations have been documented between analyst forecast accuracy and analyst following 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1996), absence of material weaknesses and management forecast accuracy (Feng et al., 2009; 
Li et al., 2012), management forecast accuracy and analyst following (Baginski and Hassell, 1997) and management 
forecast accuracy and analyst forecast accuracy (Coller and Yohn, 1998; Schreuder and Klaassen, 1984). 
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accuracy). Prior research has shown that managers use tax expense and the valuation allowance 
to manage earnings (Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills, 2004; Frank and Rego, 2006; Schrand and 
Wong, 2003). Cash effective tax rates do not use tax expense in the numerator and are unaffected 
by changes in the valuation allowance or tax cushion (Dyreng et al., 2008). However, in 
robustness checks, we show our inferences do not change when we use tax avoidance proxies 
that have an accrual component (GAAP ETR and book-tax difference). Hence, we argue that the 
firm’s IIQ affects tax avoidance for both cash and book purposes. 
As discussed above, we employ five different proxies for internal information quality: the 
number of days between the end of the fiscal year and the earnings announcement multiplied by -
1 (EA Speed), the difference between the management earnings forecast and the actual earnings 
divided by price and multiplied by -1 (MF Acc), an indicator variable equal to one if the firm did 
not report a section 404 material weakness and zero otherwise (No MW), the log of the number 
of analyst forecasts (Analyst Following), and the difference between the median analyst forecast 
and the actual earnings divided by price multiplied by -1 (AF Acc). Note that, for all of these 
variables, higher values indicate better IIQ. MF Acc, Analyst Following, and AF Acc are 
measured using the last available observation before the fiscal period end. In the regressions, 
each of the continuous information proxies (EA Speed, MF Acc, Analyst Following, and AF Acc) 
are ranked into quintiles in each year and scaled such that they range from 0 (the lowest quintile) 
to 1 (the highest quintile). Thus, the coefficients on these IIQ proxies can be interpreted as the 
effect of moving from the bottom quintile to the top quintile on the tax avoidance proxy, whereas 
the coefficient on No MW can be interpreted as the effect of not having a section 404 material 
weakness. We expect a negative coefficient on each IIQ proxy, consistent with better 
information allowing for more tax avoidance. 
We include a number of control variables that prior research has shown to be associated 
with tax avoidance outcomes (Cheng et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2008; McGuire et al., 2012; 
Phillips, 2003; Rego, 2003; Rego and Wilson, 2012). Size is the natural logarithm of average 
total assets, and prior research has found significant yet mixed signed results. PPE and ΔPPE are 
the average property, plant, and equipment scaled by average total assets and the change in 
property, plant, and equipment scaled by average total assets, respectively.
27
 We capture the 
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 As in Dyreng et al. (2008), we expect capital intensive firms to have more tax planning opportunities, and the 
change in PPE to be associated with benefits of accelerated depreciation for tax purposes. 
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firm’s interest tax shield by including Leverage, which is the firm’s average long-term debt 
scaled by average total assets. Intangibles, measured as the average intangible assets scaled by 
average total assets, are a proxy for the firm’s ability to shift income. Since firms receive tax 
credits for research and development, we include R&D Expense, which is the firm’s R&D 
expense divided by average total assets. We include two proxies that capture the extent to which 
firms may have prior operating losses, NOL Dummy and ΔNOL, which are an indicator variable 
capturing whether the firm has a net operating loss carryforward at the beginning of the year and 
the change in the net operating loss carryforward scaled by average total assets, respectively. 
Both will result in the firm paying less tax. Extraordinary is the firm’s extraordinary items scaled 
by average total assets.
28
 We use two measures of the extent of the firm’s foreign operations that 
have been found in prior research to explain tax avoidance, albeit with inconsistent signs: 
Foreign Income, which is the firm’s foreign income scaled by average total assets, and FI 
Dummy, which is an indicator variable equal to one if foreign income is non-zero and zero 
otherwise. Incentives to do tax avoidance are likely to vary with profitability, so we include 
ROA, the firm’s operating income before depreciation scaled by average total assets. We include 
the market-to-book ratio (MTB), measured as average market equity scaled by average book 
equity. As a proxy for growth we employ Sales Growth, measured as the change in sales scaled 
by average total assets. We include the firm’s age (Age), which is the log of the number of years 
since the first year the firm was on Compustat, since younger firms may have differential 
incentives and ability to avoid taxes than older firms. Finally, we include industry and firm year 
fixed effects in order to capture differences in tax avoidance across industries and time.
29
 All 
variables are defined in the appendix. 
To the extent that uncertainty drives both poor IIQ and makes tax planning more difficult, 
it could represent a correlated omitted variable in our analysis. Indeed, we hypothesize (H3) and 
find that uncertainty makes tax planning more complicated. Also, at least for some of our IIQ 
proxies, prior literature has established that they may be correlated with uncertainty.
30
 We 
include an additional control variable, Sales Volatility, to capture the general uncertainty 
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 Extraordinary items are not reflected in the denominator of the ETR, since they are reported below pretax income. 
However, it is likely that firms pay at least some cash tax on income from extraordinary items, which will be 
reflected in the cash tax paid numerator, and hence we predict a positive coefficient.  
29
 Inclusion of industry fixed effects also mitigates endogeneity concerns resulting from industries likely having 
differing quality of internal information as well as tax avoidance opportunities and abilities. 
30




regarding the firm’s operating environment.
31




In testing hypothesis 5, we use the specification in equation 1, but modify the 
measurements of each variable to match the 5-year period over which we calculate Cash ETR 
Volatility. For our information proxies, we calculate the average of the ranked variable over the 
5-year period. We also measure our control variables over the 5-year period. We still include 
industry and year fixed effects in this analysis. 
To test hypotheses 2 and 3, we add an interaction term to equation 1 as follows: 
                      
                                             
                                                       
                                                                           
 
                      
                                       
                                                 
                                                                           
 
For equations 2 and 3 we use Cash ETR as the tax avoidance proxy. We include the same 
set of control variables as in equation 1, as well as industry and year fixed effects. 
In equation 2 we use two different measures of coordination needs. Bushman et al. (2004) 
measure segment concentration as the sum of the squares of firm sales in each segment scaled by 
total firm sales. Using this measure, a firm with ten segments with equal sales would have a 
segment concentration of 0.10, whereas a firm with only one segment would have a segment 
concentration of 1. In a similar spirit, we create a proxy for segment dispersion, which is 
measured as the segment concentration minus 1 then multiplied by -1. Continuing the above 
example, the firm with ten segments with equal sales would have a segment dispersion value of 
0.9 while the firm with only one segment would have a segment dispersion value of zero. We use 
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 Furthermore, we conduct two cross-sectional tests in the next section, and a change analysis in the sixth section to 
reduce concerns of correlated omitted variables. 
32
 We use the standard deviation of sales rather than that of other variables (such as net income) because the former 
is less affected by managerial actions such as earnings management. 
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two versions of our segment dispersion measure to capture coordination needs: Geographic 
Dispersion and Business Dispersion, which use geographic and business segments, respectively. 
We expect both coordination needs proxies to be positively associated with Cash ETR, as firm 
coordination difficulties inhibits effective tax planning. Furthermore, we expect a negative 
coefficient on the interaction of Info Quality and Organizational Complexity, consistent with the 
negative effect of firm coordination needs on tax avoidance being reduced for firms with higher 
quality information. 
In equation 3 we employ two measures of uncertainty. Restructure is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a restructuring expense and zero otherwise. Sales Volatility 
is the standard deviation of the firm’s sales over the current five year period, scaled by the 
median assets over the period. Restructure captures whether the firm is undergoing a time of 
increased uncertainty, and Sales Volatility, as discussed above, captures the uncertainty of the 
firm’s operating environment. We expect that the coefficients on Restructure and Sales Volatility 
will be positive, consistent with times of increased uncertainty and volatile operating 
environments making it more difficult to achieve favorable tax avoidance outcomes. However, 
consistent with hypothesis 3, we expect a negative coefficient on the interaction of our IIQ proxy 
and our uncertainty proxies, consistent with better IIQ helping alleviate the negative effect of 
uncertainty on tax avoidance. 
 
4.2 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 We employ financial accounting and segment data from Compustat, stock market data 
from CRSP, earnings announcement as well as management and analyst forecast data from 
IBES, and section 404 material weakness data from Audit Analytics.
33
 We follow Dyreng and 
Lindsey (2009, pg. 1296) and set the following variables to zero if missing in Compustat: 
advertising expense, research and development expense, tax loss carryforwards, intangible 
assets, special items, and long-term debt. Furthermore, we employ their methodology to correct 
for errors in foreign tax expense, foreign pre-tax income, pre-tax domestic income, total pre-tax 
income, federal current tax expense, and worldwide current tax expense.  
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 In the 404 dataset, the auditor will provide an adverse opinion when the internal control system is found to be 
ineffective due to a material weakness, which we use to construct our indicator variable. There is a very high 
correlation between the instance of a 404 material weakness 404 and a 302 material weakness over our sample 
period (2004 – 2010), and results based on No 302 MW are very similar. 
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Our sample period runs from 1994 to 2010. We begin our sample period in 1994, post the 
enactment of SFAS No. 109, to have consistent accounting for income taxes throughout the 
sample. For a firm-year observation to make our sample, it has to have non-missing data for each 
control variable and at least one IIQ proxy. Four of our IIQ proxies (EA Speed, MF Acc, Analyst 
Following, and AF Acc) are available throughout the entire time period (1994 to 2010), whereas 
No MW is only available from 2004 to 2010. The number of firm-years in our annual Cash ETR 
regressions range from 8,963 (using MF Acc) to 32,591 (using EA Speed). The sample size is 
reduced when we investigate UTB (which is only available from 2007 to 2010) and Cash ETR 
Volatility (which uses variables measured over five year periods). 
Panel A of Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for our sample.
34
 For the purposes of 
Table 1, we tabulate the unranked versions of our IIQ proxies. The average Cash ETR is 26% 
and the 5-year standard deviation is 12%. Panel B contains correlations for our sample variables. 
For brevity, we only tabulate the correlations for the tax avoidance proxies, the IIQ proxies, and 
the coordination needs and uncertainty variables. Cash ETR and Cash ETR Volatility are 
generally negatively correlated with our IIQ proxies, consistent with better IIQ allowing for more 
effective tax avoidance. However, the correlations between UTB and the IIQ proxies are 
inconsistent (three of five Pearson correlations are negative). Turning to the IIQ proxies, all 
proxies are positively correlated, with Pearson correlations ranging from 0.07 to 0.44.35 This 
provides reassurance that all our measures capture the same underlying concept of the quality of 
the firm’s internal information environment. 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Internal Information Quality and Tax Avoidance 
First, we examine whether firms that have better IIQ are able to achieve more favorable 
tax avoidance outcomes (hypothesis 1). To test this, we estimate equation 1 via OLS with Cash 
ETR as the dependent variable. Table 2 contains the results of this analysis. Each column 
employs a different IIQ proxy (from left to right: EA Speed, MF Acc, No MW, Analyst 
Following, and AF Acc), and contains the full set of control variables as well as industry and year 
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 Variables are based on amounts denominated in millions of U.S. dollars. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at 1 percent and 99 percent, except for Cash ETR which is winsorized at 0 and 1. 
35
 Correlations between the ranked IIQ proxies are qualitatively similar. 
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fixed effects (coefficients on fixed effects not reported). In general, the coefficients on the 
control variables are statistically significant and match those found in prior research. For 
example, the coefficients on PPE, ΔPPE, Leverage, R&D Expense, NOL Dummy, and Foreign 
Income are all negative, consistent with depreciation, interest expense, research and 
development, prior losses, and foreign income decreasing Cash ETRs. Extraordinary items 
increase Cash ETR, as predicted. 
Using each of the five proxies, we find a negative relation between IIQ and Cash ETR. 
The relation is statistically significant, with all five p-values less than 0.01.
36
 The coefficients on 
the IIQ proxies indicate that moving one quintile in the ranked variables is associated with a 
decrease in Cash ETR of approximately 1 percent, and moving from the bottom quintile to the 
top quintile in the ranked variables is associated with decreases in Cash ETR ranging from 2.2 
percent to 4.1 percent. Having a section 404 material weakness is associated with an increase in 
Cash ETR of 5.1 percent. This is in line with Bauer (2011) and consistent with a section 404 
material weakness being indicative of being a firm at the very extreme low end of the IIQ 
spectrum.
37
 Overall, these results indicate that firms with better quality information have lower 
Cash ETR, consistent with these firms being better able to engage in effective tax avoidance.  
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
 
5.2 Internal Information Quality, Coordination, and Tax Avoidance 
 Next, we test whether more disparate organizations that have greater coordination needs 
have less favorable tax avoidance outcomes, and whether IIQ helps such firms coordinate in 
order to achieve more effective tax avoidance outcomes (hypotheses 2a and 2b). Table 3 contains 
the results of estimating equation 2 via OLS with Cash ETR as the proxy for tax avoidance. As in 
Table 2, each column employs a different proxy for IIQ. For brevity, we only report the 
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 Statistical inferences are made using one-tailed tests for variables with predictions, and two-tailed tests otherwise. 
37
 Note that Bauer (2011) finds significant results on tax-related material weaknesses only: In his 2004 to 2006 
sample, he finds that firms with a tax-related material weakness on average have a 4% higher Cash ETR. Our 
finding of a higher increase of 5% as a consequence of any internal control material weakness suggests that our 
variable No MW indeed proxies for the entire internal information environment of the firm, and not solely for the 
quality of strictly tax-related information. The comparison of these results suggests that the quality of the internal 
information environment as a whole is important to pursue effective tax planning. 
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coefficients on the IIQ proxy, the dispersion proxy, and the interaction term. Panel A examines 
geographic segment dispersion and panel B investigates business segment dispersion.
38
 
 In panel A, Geographic Dispersion is positive and statistically significant in all five 
regressions, consistent with geographic segment dispersion inhibiting effective tax avoidance. 
The magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that a one standard deviation increase in Geographic 
Dispersion is associated with a 3 to 4 percent increase in Cash ETR. However, the negative 
effect of geographic dispersion on tax avoidance is mitigated for firms with better IIQ: the 
coefficient on the interaction of IIQ and Geographic Dispersion is negative and highly 
significant using all five IIQ proxies. The amount of mitigation ranges from approximately 50 
percent for firms without a 404 MW to approximately 90 percent for firms in the top quintile of 
AF Acc. These results are broadly consistent with IIQ alleviating the negative effects of 
geographic dispersion on tax avoidance. 
We also investigate the effect of business unit dispersion (panel B). The coefficient on 
Business Dispersion is positive in all five regressions and statistically significant in three of five, 
indicating that in general firms with more disparate business unit operations have higher Cash 
ETRs. Again, we find that the effect of business segment dispersion on tax avoidance is 
mitigated for firms with better quality information, although the results are weaker than those 
found in panel A. Specifically, while the coefficients on the interaction term are negative using 
all five IIQ proxies, only two of the five are statistically significant. Overall, the results in table 3 
are consistent with IIQ offsetting the negative effect of geographic and business segment 
dispersion on effective tax avoidance, and making coordination across all business units or 
subsidiaries possible. 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
 
5.3 Internal Information Quality, Uncertainty, and Tax Avoidance 
Table 4 examines whether firms with more uncertainty are less effective tax planners, and 
whether having better quality information moderates the impact of uncertainty on tax avoidance 
(hypotheses 3a and 3b). To examine this, we estimate equation 3 via OLS with Cash ETR as the 
tax avoidance proxy. Panel A contains the results of this estimation using Restructure as the 
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 It may be that firms with international operations have both more tax planning opportunities and higher internal 
information quality. However, the inclusion of a foreign income dummy and the level of foreign income scaled by 
total assets should mitigate these endogeneity concerns. 
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uncertainty proxy, and panel B replaces Restructure with Sales Volatility. Again, for brevity we 
only report the coefficients on the IIQ proxy, the uncertainty proxy, and the interaction term. 
The coefficient on Restructure in panel A indicates that firms undergoing restructuring 
have on average higher Cash ETRs, consistent with our prediction that these firms are 
undergoing periods of increased uncertainty which inhibits effective tax planning. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is significantly negative, implying that firms with better 
quality information are able to mitigate the effect of uncertainty on tax planning. In fact, the 
coefficient on the interaction term is generally larger than that on Restructure, suggesting that 
firms with the best quality information (top quintile of ranked IIQ proxies, no 404 material 
weaknesses) are able to achieve even lower Cash ETR during restructuring periods than in non-
restructuring periods. We speculate that firms that are undergoing restructuring are able to tap 
into new tax avoidance opportunities (for example through TESCM – tax-efficient supply chain 
management) that become visible only if they have a high quality information environment. 
In panel B, we employ a measure of operating environment uncertainty, Sales Volatility. 
Again we find positive and significant (in four of five regressions) coefficients on our 
uncertainty proxy, demonstrating that operating environment uncertainty inhibits effective tax 
avoidance. Consistent with our predictions, the coefficient on the interaction of IIQ and Sales 
Volatility is negative using all five information proxies and statistically significant with three of 
the five. In general, the results in table 4 support our hypothesis that IIQ helps alleviate the 
negative effect of uncertainty on effective tax avoidance. 
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
 
5.4 Internal Information Quality and Tax Risk 
 Table 5 examines whether firms’ budgeted tax risk varies with IIQ (hypothesis 4). Here, 
we repeat the estimation of equation 1 with our proxy for budgeted tax risk, UTB, as the 
dependent variable. Despite having fewer observations (as UTB is only available from 2007 
onward), our regressions appear to have decent power. Many control variables are statistically 
significant and adjusted r-squared ranges from 0.16 to 0.26. The coefficients on our information 
proxies are negative in four of the five regressions (EA Speed being the sole exception), and are 
statistically significant when using the two analyst-based proxies (Analyst Following and AF 
Acc). Note also that sales volatility (as a measure of operating uncertainty) does not load 
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significantly on UTB. More uncertainty does not mean that more tax risk is assumed, once 
controlling for IIQ. Overall, our results suggest that firms with better IIQ are able to achieve 
more favorable tax avoidance outcomes without assuming more risk, and perhaps are even able 
to reduce the level of risk taken. Controlling for IIQ, the link between ETR and UTB as proposed 
by Frischmann et al. (2008) is severed, since UTB now becomes a measure of tax risk assumed 
at the time of the tax filing (i.e. ex ante) rather than of tax avoidance. 
[Insert Table 5 here.] 
 
In table 6, we investigate whether firms with better quality information are able to 
minimize realized tax risk (hypothesis 5). To test this we estimate equation 1 with Cash ETR 
Volatility as our proxy for realized tax risk. Since this variable is measured over a five year 
period, we modify our IIQ proxies and control variables to be defined over the same 5-year 
period. Again, our models appear to have sufficient explanatory power, with adjusted r-squared 
ranging from 0.16 to 0.20. We find that all five of our information proxies exhibit strong 
negative associations with Cash ETR Volatility. Moving from the bottom quintile to the top 
quintile in the ranked information proxies is associated with an average reduction in Cash ETR 
Volatility of 45 percent of the sample mean, and the absence of a section 404 material weakness 
is associated with a reduction of Cash ETR Volatility of 57 percent of the sample mean. Overall, 
the results in tables 5 and 6 indicate that firms with better quality information are able to achieve 
more favorable tax avoidance outcomes while also decreasing tax risk, both budgeted and 
realized. 
[Insert Table 6 here.] 
 
6. ENDOGENEITY TESTS AND ROBUSTNESS 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our primary findings to a long-run specification, 
alternate tax avoidance proxies, correlated omitted variables and endogeneity issues, and 
alternate control variables. 
 
6.1 Long-run ETR 
 In our primary tests we use a one-year version of Cash ETR as our dependent variable. 
However, Dyreng et al. (2008) argue that long-run measures of tax avoidance are superior to 
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short-run measures in that they avoid variation in annual measures driven by timing differences 
and negative denominators. We investigate whether the results in table 1 are robust to using a 
longer-run measure of tax avoidance. Table 7 contains the results of estimating equation 1 with 
the five-year cash effective tax rate (Cash ETR5) as the dependent variable. Similar to table 6, 
we redefine our IIQ proxies and control variables to match the five-year period over which the 
dependent variable is measured. The coefficient on our IIQ proxies is consistently negative and 
statistically significant. Moving from bottom quintile to the top quintile in our IIQ proxies in 
each of the five years is associated with reductions in Cash ETR5 ranging from 4 percent to 10 
percent, and not having a section 404 material weakness in any year of the five year period is 
associated with a reduction in the five-year cash effective tax rate of 7 percent. The results in 
table 7 indicate that our primary results are robust, both statistically and economically, to using 
longer-run measures of tax avoidance. 
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
 
Dyreng et al. (2008) present interesting (but unexplained – see footnote 21) results on the 
persistence of ETRs: low ETRs are more persistent than high ETRs.  In conjunction with our 
results on Cash ETR Volatility, our focus on IIQ begins to address such explanation, since we 
find that higher IIQ leads both to lower ETRs and to lower ETR volatility, which ensures that 




6.2 Alternate tax avoidance proxies 
 As discussed earlier, we employ the firm’s cash effective tax rate as our primary measure 
of tax avoidance in order to avoid any mechanical relations between our tax avoidance proxy and 
IIQ variables, some of which involve forecasting accounting earnings. Additionally, a commonly 
used alternate measure of tax avoidance, the book effective tax rate or GAAP ETR, is increased 
when a liability for uncertain tax positions is recorded, at which point a mechanical correlation 
between GAAP ETR and UTB (our measure of budgeted tax risk) is created. Nevertheless, we 
investigate the sensitivity of our results to two alternative proxies for tax avoidance that do have 
a more important accounting accrual aspect: the firm’s book effective tax rate (GAAP ETR, 
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 Guenther et al. (2012) document that low ETR volatility and low ETR are correlated, arguing that hence both 
measures cannot be capturing the same concept of tax avoidance. However, they do not explain what could cause 
such positive correlation. We propose IIQ as a causal factor. 
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measured as the current tax expense divided by pre-tax income) and book-tax difference (BTD, 
measured as pre-tax book income minus estimated taxable income, scaled by average total 
assets).  When we regress annual levels, annual changes, volatility, and five-year levels of both 
alternate tax avoidance proxies on the five IIQ proxies, untabulated results show that 85 and 65 
percent of the coefficients are statistically significant with the predicted sign on GAAP ETR and 
BTD, respectively.
40
 We also investigate the effects of IIQ on firms with higher coordination 
needs and more uncertainty employing GAAP ETR and BTD as the tax planning proxies. 
Untabulated results show that, when using GAAP ETR, we find similar results to those found in 
tables 3 and 4, with stronger results on business dispersion and restructuring, but weaker results 
on sales volatility. However, results with BTD are weaker throughout tables 3 and 4. We 
conclude that our inferences are robust to these two alternate measures of tax avoidance. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that higher IIQ allows managers to avoid more taxes for both 
cash and book purposes. 
 
6.3 Correlated omitted variables and endogeneity 
 Our results are consistent with the notion that IIQ is driving the firm’s tax avoidance 
outcomes. However, it may be the case that there are other variables that are correlated with both 
the presence of a high quality internal information environment and tax avoidance opportunities. 
Furthermore, if IIQ and tax avoidance are both choices on the part of the firm, our analyses may 
suffer from endogeneity. In this section we attempt to rule out correlated omitted variables and 
endogeneity as potential concerns. 
 First, we include an expansive set of control variables that could capture differences in 
both IIQ and tax avoidance opportunities across firms. For example, it is likely that certain 
industries and firms with international operations have better quality internal information and 
more tax avoidance opportunities. Thus, we directly control for industry membership (through 
industry fixed effects) and international operations (through a foreign income dummy and the 
level of foreign income scaled by assets) in our regressions. 
Second, since there are likely unobservable firm characteristics for which we cannot 
include controls in our analyses, we also estimate our primary regression in first differences. This 
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 We repeat the analyses in tables 2 (levels), 6 (volatility), 7 (long-run) and 8 (changes), and find that 17/20 and 
13/20 coefficients, respectively, to be significant with the predicted sign. 
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should remove the effect of these unobservable firm characteristics that are constant across time. 
The results of estimating a changes model (with ΔCash ETR as the dependent variable) are 
presented in table 8. For brevity, we only report the coefficient on the changes in our IIQ proxies. 
The coefficient on the change in IIQ is negative for all five proxies, and is statistically significant 
when using ΔEA Speed, ΔMF Acc, and ΔAF Acc. The insignificance of the coefficients on ΔNo 
MW and ΔAnalyst Following is likely caused by the lack of observed changes in these variables: 
only 8 percent of observations with non-missing ΔNo MW and only 38 percent of observations 
with non-missing ΔAnalyst Following have non-zero changes, compared to 35 percent, 62 
percent, and 70 percent for ΔEA Speed, ΔMF Acc, and ΔAF Acc, respectively. The results in table 
8 rule out the possibility that our IIQ proxies are capturing a correlated omitted variable that is 
constant across time. Furthermore, they suggest that changes in the firm’s IIQ affect its ability to 
avoid taxes. 
[Insert Table 8 here]. 
 
 Third, we re-estimate the analysis in table 2 replacing the current year’s Cash ETR with 
the next year’s Cash ETR, thus examining whether the proxies for the current quality of the 
internal information environment can help predict tax avoidance in the subsequent year. 
Untabulated results show a significant negative relation between all five IIQ proxies and next 
year’s Cash ETR. 
Fourth, we rely on a shock to the quality of the internal information environment of the 
firm: the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. Sarbanes-Oxley required firms to assess the adequacy of 
their internal controls on financial reporting and disclose whether they had a material weakness. 
Thus, the act brought negative attention to firms that had to initially disclose a material 
weakness, possibly forcing them to focus on improving their IIQ. We examine whether firms that 
initially disclosed a section 404 material weakness after the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley 
and subsequently remedied the material weakness display lower Cash ETRs after remedying 
their material weakness compared to all other firms. To test this, we employ a differences-in-
differences design: we regress Cash ETR on an indicator variable equaling one for firms that 
initially disclosed a section 404 material weakness in 2004 but remedied it immediately (that is, 
failed to disclose a 404 MW after 2004), an indicator variable equaling one for the years 2005 
and 2006, and the interaction of these two variables. We run this test over the period 2002 to 
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2006 (which captures two years before the initial disclosure, the year of initial disclosure, and 
two years afterward) and include the full set of control variables. We find that the coefficient on 
the interaction term is negative and statistically significant (-0.046, one-tailed p-value of 0.029), 
suggesting that those firms that improved their internal information environment post the shock 
imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley experienced an economically meaningful reduction in their Cash 
ETR relative to other firms. 
We believe that including our extensive set of control variables, the consistency of our 
results when employing both a first-differences specification as well as next period’s Cash ETR 
rather than current period’s Cash ETR as the dependent variable, and showing the effect of the 
shock to firms’ information environment caused by Sarbanes-Oxley on tax avoidance suggest 
that correlated omitted variables and endogeneity are not responsible for our results. 
 
6.4. Alternate control variables 
 Although we already use a very extensive set of controls, we also investigate the 
sensitivity of our results to several potential additional control variables. First, it may be the case 
that our IIQ measures simply pick up firms that have less volatile income streams, which likely 
affects tax avoidance outcomes. We include Pre-tax Income Volatility (standard deviation of pre-
tax income over the current five year period, scaled by median total assets over the same period) 
as a proxy for earnings smoothness. Untabulated results show that the IIQ proxies are still 
negatively and significantly associated with Cash ETR and Cash ETR Volatility, even after 
controlling for the smoothness of the pre-tax earnings. 
 We also include the following additional control variables: Asset Growth (current assets 
minus lagged assets, scaled by lagged assets), Inventory (average inventory divided by average 
total assets), Advertising (advertising expenses divided by average total assets), Special Items 
(special items divided by total assets), Stock Return Volatility (standard deviation of stock returns 
over current twelve months), and Sales Growth Volatility (standard deviation of sales growth 
over the current five year period). Our inferences are unchanged when including these additional 






7. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Our paper takes an important step towards unraveling the black box of tax avoidance by 
studying the role the internal information environment of the firm plays in supporting effective 
tax planning resulting in increased tax avoidance via the mechanisms of (1) resolution of 
uncertainty through information acquisition, (2) coordination through information dissemination 
and (3) reduction of tax outcome risk, both budgeted and actual. Only by disentangling the risk 
aspect from the tax avoidance measure by understanding the quality of the information on which 
tax planning decisions are based, can we really understand and define what it means to exhibit 
tax (non)aggressiveness. Further, our findings demonstrate the importance of building bridges 
between managerial accounting and taxation research. 
We see a lot of avenues for further research. First, using our proxies for internal information 
quality, subsequent studies can further disentangle which variables affect the tax risk (both 
budgeted and actual) and which variables affect tax avoidance conditional on such risk. For 
example, it may well be that high IIQ firms do not need to enter more risky tax shelter 
constructions if they are able to achieve a low (enough) ETR without assuming much risk. Also, 
the market’s perception of tax avoidance may be different for firms with high versus low IIQ. 
Second, recent research has started to look at how performance measurement and incentives 
internally in the firm affect taxation outcomes (e.g. Armstrong et al., 2012; Phillips, 2003; 
Robinson et al., 2010). Future research can address how other aspects of managerial accounting 
impact on taxation. For example, it is feasible that the quality of the budgeting process, the 
match between organizational and informational design, and the precision by which performance 
measurement information is collected all affect the quality of tax planning decisions. Lastly, 
although our focus in this paper is on tax avoidance, IIQ affects a lot of other aspects of decision 
making in the firm, such as procurement, capital investment decisions, production and project 
planning, product or service mix choices, customer mix choices, and the like. New insights can 
be generated into how the quality of such decisions and their outcomes is based on the quality of 
the internal information environment. With optimism fueled by the resurgence of academic 
interest in bridging between different areas of accounting research, we look forward to work that 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Dependent Variables Descriptions 
Cash ETR Cash taxes paid, divided by pre-tax income adjusted for special items 
Cash ETR Volatility Standard deviation of Cash ETR over current 5-year period 
UTB Average unrecognized tax benefit, divided by average total assets 
    
Internal Information 
Quality (IIQ) Variables Descriptions 
EA Speed Number of days between the end of the fiscal year and the firm's 
earnings announcement, multiplied by -1 
MF Acc Absolute value of (management's estimate of EPS minus actual EPS) 
multiplied by -1, divided by price 
No MW Indicator variable equal to 0 if firm reported a 404 MW in current fiscal 
year, and 1 otherwise 
Analyst Following Log of number of analyst estimates 
AF Acc Absolute value of (median analyst estimate of EPS minus actual EPS) 
multiplied by -1, divided by price 
    
Other Variables Descriptions 
Geographic Dispersion Sum of the squares of (firm sales in each geographic segment / total firm 
sales) minus 1, then multiplied by -1 
Business Dispersion Sum of the squares of (firm sales in each business segment / total firm 
sales) minus 1, then multiplied by -1 
Restructure Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a restructuring expense 
in the current fiscal year, and zero otherwise 
Sales Volatility Standard deviation of sales over current five year period, scaled by 
median assets over the same period 
Size Natural log of average total assets 
PPE Average property, plant, and equipment, divided by average total assets 
ΔPPE PPE minus last year's PPE, divided by average total assets 
Leverage Average long-term debt, scaled by average total assets 
Intangibles Average intangible assets, scaled by average total assets 
R&D Expense Research & development expense, divided by average total assets 
NOL Dummy Indicator variable equal to 1 if net operating loss carryforward at 
beginning of the year is positive, and zero otherwise 
ΔNOL Current net operating loss carryforward minus last year's net operating 
loss carryforward, divided by average total assets 
Extraordinary Items Extraordinary items, divided by average total assets 
Foreign Income Pre-tax foreign income, divided by average total assets 
FI Dummy Indicator variable equal to 1 if pre-tax foreign income is non-zero and 
zero otherwise 
ROA Operating income before depreciation, divided by average total assets 
MTB Average market value of equity, divided by average common equity 
Sales Growth Current sales minus last year's sales, divided by last year's sales 
Age Log of number of years since first year on Compustat database 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 







Cash ETR 35167 0.26 0.21 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.36 1.00 
Cash ETR Volatility 22316 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.16 0.42 
UTB 6626 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.13 
EA Speed 48536 -46.67 20.97 -132.00 -57.00 -43.00 -31.00 -16.00 
MF Acc 10321 -0.02 0.06 -0.45 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
No MW 15874 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Analyst Following 48862 1.42 1.00 0.00 0.69 1.39 2.20 3.37 
AF Acc 48072 -0.10 0.51 -4.37 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Geographic Dispersion 44158 0.23 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.47 0.80 
Business Dispersion 47202 0.19 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.79 
Restructure 49642 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Sales Volatility 46341 0.29 0.31 0.01 0.10 0.20 0.36 1.92 
Size 49642 5.95 1.87 1.44 4.57 5.82 7.21 10.46 
PPE 49642 0.28 0.24 0.01 0.09 0.20 0.41 0.89 
ΔPPE 49642 0.03 0.09 -0.23 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.44 
Leverage 49642 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.30 0.83 
Intangibles 49642 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.70 
R&D Expense 49642 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.61 
NOL Dummy 49642 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
ΔNOL 49642 0.04 0.19 -0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.31 
Extraordinary Items 49642 0.00 0.02 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Foreign Income 49642 0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
FI Dummy 49642 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
ROA 49642 0.08 0.20 -0.91 0.05 0.12 0.18 0.43 
MTB 49642 3.00 3.84 -10.67 1.35 2.16 3.61 23.93 
Sales Growth 49642 0.21 0.57 -0.77 -0.01 0.10 0.26 4.17 





Panel B: Correlations 
 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Cash ETR   0.26 -0.05 -0.03 -0.13 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.04 
2 Cash ETR Volatility 0.11   -0.01 -0.16 -0.15 -0.08 -0.18 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.01 
3 UTB -0.01 -0.05   0.10 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.21 -0.02 0.16 -0.04 
4 EA Speed 0.00 -0.16 0.26   0.18 0.30 0.44 0.22 0.17 0.08 0.06 -0.06 
5 MF Acc -0.05 -0.16 0.09 0.17   0.10 0.19 0.39 0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 
6 No MW -0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.20 0.11   0.13 0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 
7 Analyst Following -0.02 -0.19 0.14 0.45 0.27 0.13   0.20 0.17 0.12 0.06 -0.02 
8 AF Acc 0.02 -0.21 0.07 0.36 0.58 0.13 0.47   0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 
9 Geographic Dispersion -0.03 0.01 0.33 0.19 0.08 -0.03 0.17 0.10   0.17 0.30 -0.12 
10 Business Dispersion 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.09 0.18   0.16 -0.08 
11 Restructure -0.06 0.05 0.24 0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.30 0.15   -0.11 
12 Sales Volatility 0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12   
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses.  Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the sample and Panel B presents the 
Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) correlations.  The sample is composed of all observations with non-missing data for control variables 
and at least one IIQ proxy. All variables are defined in the appendix. For the purposes of this table, the IIQ proxies are presented in their unranked form. All 









TABLE 2: INTERNAL INFORMATION QUALITY AND TAX AVOIDANCE 
  IIQ Proxy: EA Speed MF Acc No MW Analyst Foll AF Acc 
 VARIABLES Dep Var: Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR 
IIQ Pred  -0.026*** -0.036*** -0.052*** -0.022*** -0.041*** 
   Sign: - (-4.835) (-5.408) (-4.608) (-3.485) (-8.302) 
Size   0.003** -0.003 -0.002 0.004** 0.003** 
    (1.979) (-1.446) (-0.948) (2.380) (2.264) 
PPE   -0.045*** 0.005 -0.010 -0.047*** -0.047*** 
    (-3.453) (0.192) (-0.471) (-3.647) (-3.601) 
ΔPPE   -0.028 -0.092* -0.086** -0.017 -0.014 
    (-1.400) (-1.780) (-2.165) (-0.835) (-0.678) 
Leverage   -0.101*** -0.085*** -0.097*** -0.101*** -0.108*** 
    (-7.045) (-3.293) (-4.986) (-7.101) (-7.532) 
Intangibles   0.023* 0.020 0.030* 0.024* 0.031** 
    (1.751) (1.042) (1.647) (1.856) (2.365) 
R&D Expense   -0.282*** -0.325*** -0.297*** -0.293*** -0.307*** 
    (-8.106) (-4.984) (-4.867) (-8.495) (-8.945) 
NOL Dummy   -0.036*** -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.036*** -0.037*** 
    (-9.635) (-3.938) (-5.159) (-9.643) (-9.954) 
ΔNOL   0.019 0.075** 0.021 0.019 0.017 
    (1.019) (2.117) (0.815) (0.992) (0.874) 
Extraordinary Items   0.978*** 0.906*** 1.298*** 0.977*** 0.990*** 
    (8.061) (4.197) (4.390) (8.099) (8.084) 
Foreign Income   -0.340*** -0.125 -0.386*** -0.339*** -0.327*** 
    (-5.046) (-1.313) (-4.397) (-4.994) (-4.811) 
FI Dummy   0.034*** 0.022*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
    (7.819) (3.380) (5.313) (7.773) (7.772) 
ROA   -0.033 -0.008 0.008 -0.038* -0.008 
    (-1.463) (-0.200) (0.217) (-1.684) (-0.356) 
MTB   -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001* -0.003*** -0.003*** 
    (-6.319) (-3.971) (-1.793) (-6.064) (-5.864) 
Sales Growth   -0.068*** -0.066*** -0.076*** -0.067*** -0.068*** 
    (-14.502) (-6.082) (-8.811) (-14.503) (-14.609) 
Sales Volatility   0.035*** 0.021* 0.026** 0.038*** 0.036*** 
    (6.227) (1.858) (2.075) (6.672) (6.412) 
Age   0.007*** 0.004 0.010*** 0.005** 0.006** 
    (2.750) (0.957) (2.678) (2.252) (2.525) 
Industry FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations   32,591 8,963 11,530 32,702 32,434 
Adj. R-squared   0.096 0.093 0.101 0.095 0.098 
This table presents the results of estimating equation 1 via OLS with Cash ETR as the dependent variable, where 
Cash ETR is measured as cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax income adjusted for special items. Each column 
employs a different IIQ proxy (EA Speed, MF Acc, No MW, Analyst Following, AF Acc). IIQ proxies are ranked into 
quintiles each year and scaled to range from 0 (bottom quintile) to 1 (top quintile). All other variables are defined in 
the appendix.  Coefficients are presented with t-statistics based on firm-clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1, 5, and 10 percent level, for one-tailed tests where there are predictions and 
two-tailed tests otherwise. 
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TABLE 3: INTERNAL INFORMATION QUALITY, COORDINATION,  
AND TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
Panel A: Geographic Segment Dispersion 
 
  IIQ Proxy: EA Speed MF Acc No MW Analyst Foll AF Acc 
  Dep Var: Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR 
VARIABLES Pred Sign      
IIQ - -0.002 -0.018** -0.023* -0.003 -0.016*** 
    (-0.274) (-1.698) (-1.428) (-0.327) (-2.512) 
Geographic Dispersion + 0.114*** 0.110*** 0.149*** 0.101*** 0.122*** 
    (7.295) (4.681) (3.638) (6.603) (7.287) 
Info Quality * 
Geographic Dispersion 
- -0.101*** -0.064** -0.075** -0.082*** -0.111*** 
  (-5.369) (-2.287) (-1.825) (-4.435) (-5.778) 
Control Variables?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations   29,843 7,978 10,322 29,938 29,707 
Adj. R-squared   0.097 0.097 0.104 0.096 0.100 
 
 
Panel B: Business Segment Dispersion 
 
  IIQ Proxy: EA Speed MF Acc No MW Analyst Foll AF Acc 
  Dep Var: Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR 
VARIABLES Pred Sign      
IIQ - -0.018*** -0.027*** -0.033** -0.014** -0.029*** 
    (-2.837) (-2.908) (-2.101) (-1.857) (-4.718) 
Business Dispersion + 0.018* 0.008 0.052 0.026** 0.036*** 
    (1.445) (0.465) (1.246) (2.095) (2.562) 
Info Quality * 
Business Dispersion 
- -0.015 -0.026 -0.052 -0.029** -0.043*** 
  (-0.892) (-1.161) (-1.248) (-1.752) (-2.486) 
Control Variables?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations   30,796 8,192 10,466 30,900 30,645 
Adj. R-squared   0.099 0.096 0.103 0.099 0.102 
This table presents the results of estimating equation 2 via OLS with Cash ETR as the dependent variable, where 
Cash ETR is measured as cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax income adjusted for special items. Panel A (B) uses 
Geographic Dispersion (Business Dispersion) as the segment dispersion proxy, where segment dispersion is the sum 
of the squares of (segment sales / total firm sales) minus 1 then times -1. Each column employs a different IIQ proxy 
(EA Speed, MF Acc, No MW, Analyst Following, AF Acc). IIQ proxies are ranked into quintiles each year and scaled 
to range from 0 (bottom quintile) to 1 (top quintile). All other variables are defined in the appendix.  Coefficients are 
presented with t-statistics based on firm-clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * denote significance 
at a 1, 5, and 10 percent level, for one-tailed tests where there are predictions and two-tailed tests otherwise.  
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TABLE 4: INTERNAL INFORMATION QUALITY, UNCERTAINTY,  
AND TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
Panel A: Restructuring 
 
  IIQ Proxy: EA Speed MF Acc No MW Analyst Foll AF Acc 
  Dep Var: Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR 
VARIABLES Pred Sign      
IIQ - -0.021*** -0.027*** -0.047*** -0.018*** -0.033*** 
    (-3.918) (-3.619) (-3.652) (-2.808) (-6.452) 
Restructure + 0.015** 0.020** 0.011 0.012* 0.024*** 
    (1.744) (1.926) (0.478) (1.470) (2.598) 
Info Quality *  - -0.025** -0.029** -0.015 -0.023** -0.044*** 
Restructure   (-2.130) (-2.107) (-0.624) (-2.072) (-3.717) 
Control Variables?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations   32,591 8,963 11,530 32,702 32,434 
Adj. R-squared   0.099 0.103 0.108 0.098 0.101 
 
Panel B: Sales Volatility 
 
  IIQ Proxy: EA Speed MF Acc No MW Analyst Foll AF Acc 
  Dep Var: Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR 
VARIABLES Pred Sign      
IIQ - -0.018*** -0.034*** -0.050*** -0.012* -0.027*** 
    (-2.679) (-3.668) (-3.190) (-1.551) (-4.030) 
Sales Volatility + 0.047*** 0.023* 0.035 0.058*** 0.063*** 
    (5.191) (1.361) (0.963) (5.862) (5.693) 
Info Quality *  
Sales Volatility 
- -0.025** -0.005 -0.010 -0.036*** -0.045*** 
  (-1.921) (-0.213) (-0.261) (-2.736) (-3.291) 
Control Variables?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations   32,591 8,963 11,530 32,702 32,434 
Adj. R-squared   0.096 0.093 0.101 0.095 0.098 
This table presents the results of estimating equation 3 via OLS with Cash ETR as the dependent variable, where 
Cash ETR is measured as cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax income adjusted for special items. Panel A (B) uses 
Restructure (Sales Volatility) as the uncertainty proxy, where Restructure is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
firm reports a restructuring charge that year and zero otherwise, and Sales Volatility is the standard deviation of sales 
over the current five year period scaled by median total assets over the same period. Each column employs a 
different IIQ proxy (EA Speed, MF Acc, No MW, Analyst Following, AF Acc). IIQ proxies are ranked into quintiles 
each year and scaled to range from 0 (bottom quintile) to 1 (top quintile). All other variables are defined in the 
appendix.  Coefficients are presented with t-statistics based on firm-clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  ***, ** 
and * denote significance at a 1, 5, and 10 percent level, for one-tailed tests where there are predictions and two-
tailed tests otherwise.  
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TABLE 5: INTERNAL INFORMATION QUALITY AND BUDGETED TAX RISK 
  IIQ Proxy: EA Speed MF Acc No MW Analyst Foll AF Acc 
 VARIABLES Dep Var: UTB UTB UTB UTB UTB 
IIQ Pred  0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003** -0.002** 
  Sign: -  (1.409) (-0.802) (-0.461) (-2.184) (-2.144) 
Size   0.001* 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
    (1.768) (3.048) (2.260) (3.174) (3.279) 
PPE   -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
    (-5.398) (-4.627) (-5.598) (-5.340) (-5.313) 
ΔPPE   -0.007 0.011 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 
    (-1.393) (1.207) (-0.647) (-1.377) (-1.308) 
Leverage   0.007* 0.012** 0.007** 0.006 0.005 
    (1.930) (2.310) (1.985) (1.594) (1.427) 
Intangibles   -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
    (-3.916) (-3.575) (-4.295) (-3.553) (-3.854) 
R&D Expense   0.061*** 0.080*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 
    (5.840) (5.227) (5.468) (6.005) (6.229) 
NOL Dummy   0.001* -0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 
    (1.838) (-0.171) (1.317) (1.899) (1.680) 
ΔNOL   0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 
    (1.100) (-0.236) (1.168) (1.003) (0.976) 
Extraordinary Items   -0.006 -0.039 -0.035 -0.001 -0.004 
    (-0.207) (-0.844) (-0.851) (-0.031) (-0.129) 
Foreign Income   0.041*** 0.089*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 
    (3.234) (4.023) (3.249) (3.227) (3.318) 
FI Dummy   0.003*** 0.002 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
    (3.163) (1.185) (3.024) (3.017) (3.397) 
ROA   0.009** 0.026*** 0.007 0.011*** 0.011*** 
    (2.095) (2.905) (1.452) (2.625) (2.585) 
MTB   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
    (-1.128) (-1.470) (-1.159) (-0.660) (-0.811) 
Sales Growth   -0.002** -0.007** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
    (-2.234) (-2.103) (-2.045) (-2.278) (-2.106) 
Sales Volatility   0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 
    (0.873) (-0.677) (1.105) (0.853) (0.458) 
Age   0.001** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 
    (2.554) (3.688) (2.785) (2.190) (2.450) 
Industry FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations   6,232 1,576 5,944 6,287 6,083 
Adj. R-squared   0.160 0.260 0.172 0.158 0.161 
This table presents the results of estimating equation 1 via OLS with UTB as the dependent variable, where UTB is 
measured as the average unrecognized tax benefit scaled by average total assets. Each column employs a different 
IIQ proxy (EA Speed, MF Acc, No MW, Analyst Following, AF Acc). IIQ proxies are ranked into quintiles each year 
and scaled to range from 0 (bottom quintile) to 1 (top quintile). All other variables are defined in the appendix.  
Coefficients are presented with t-statistics based on firm-clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * 




TABLE 6: INTERNAL INFORMATION QUALITY AND REALIZED TAX RISK 
  IIQ5 Proxy: EA Speed MF Acc No MW Analyst Foll AF Acc 
 VARIABLES Dep Var: CashETRVol CashETRVol CashETRVol CashETRVol CashETRVol 
IIQ5 Pred -0.031*** -0.063*** -0.068** -0.015** -0.105*** 
  Sign: - (-5.159) (-4.175) (-2.345) (-2.013) (-12.891) 
Size5   -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.002 
    (-3.331) (-3.149) (-2.606) (-2.817) (-1.557) 
PPE5   0.028** 0.030 0.011 0.021 0.018 
    (2.093) (0.978) (0.425) (1.583) (1.374) 
ΔPPE5   -0.075*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.070*** -0.057*** 
    (-8.900) (-2.815) (-2.735) (-8.187) (-6.861) 
Leverage5   0.032** 0.035 0.035 0.036*** 0.010 
    (2.527) (1.111) (1.640) (2.789) (0.804) 
Intangibles5   -0.050*** -0.058** -0.087*** -0.049*** -0.034*** 
    (-4.204) (-2.458) (-4.610) (-4.106) (-2.876) 
R&D Expense5   0.114*** 0.018 -0.006 0.094*** 0.084*** 
    (4.432) (0.307) (-0.125) (3.634) (3.354) 
NOL Dummy5   0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
    (0.625) (0.405) (0.190) (0.743) (0.638) 
ΔNOL5   0.013 0.016 -0.002 0.014 0.015 
    (0.968) (0.500) (-0.089) (0.985) (1.106) 
Extraordinary Items5   0.702*** 1.273** 1.025** 0.681*** 0.760*** 
    (3.486) (2.334) (1.985) (3.378) (3.878) 
Foreign Income5   -0.220*** -0.234* -0.393*** -0.213*** -0.200*** 
    (-3.443) (-1.855) (-3.815) (-3.285) (-3.149) 
FI Dummy5   0.015*** 0.011 0.009 0.014*** 0.014*** 
    (3.662) (1.326) (1.243) (3.547) (3.593) 
ROA5   -0.425*** -0.404*** -0.426*** -0.430*** -0.355*** 
    (-16.428) (-6.728) (-9.933) (-16.548) (-13.779) 
MTB5   -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
    (-0.648) (0.215) (-0.075) (-0.808) (0.778) 
Sales Growth5   -0.001** -0.001 -0.003** -0.001* -0.001 
    (-2.096) (-0.289) (-2.036) (-1.943) (-1.614) 
Sales Volatility   0.038*** 0.014 0.040* 0.038*** 0.036*** 
    (5.916) (0.916) (1.865) (6.008) (6.089) 
Age5   -0.000 0.008* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
    (-0.194) (1.648) (-0.024) (-0.512) (-0.610) 
Industry FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations   14,543 2,332 2,938 14,543 14,472 
Adj. R-squared   0.166 0.204 0.173 0.161 0.193 
This table presents the results of estimating equation 1 via OLS with Cash ETR Volatility as the dependent variable, 
where Cash ETR Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of Cash ETR over the current five year period. 
Each column employs a different IIQ proxy (EA Speed, MF Acc, No MW, Analyst Following, AF Acc). IIQ proxies 
are ranked into quintiles each year and scaled to range from 0 (bottom quintile) to 1 (top quintile), and then are 
averaged over the current five year period. All other variables are defined in the appendix, and are measured over 
the current five year period.  Coefficients are presented with t-statistics based on firm-clustered standard errors in 
parenthesis.  ***, ** and * denote significance at a 1, 5, and 10 percent level, for one-tailed tests where there are 
predictions and two-tailed tests otherwise. 
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TABLE 7: IIQ AND LONG-RUN TAX AVOIDANCE 
  IIQ5 Proxy: EA Speed MF Acc No MW Analyst Foll AF Acc 
 VARIABLES Dep Var: Cash ETR5 Cash ETR5 Cash ETR5 Cash ETR5 Cash ETR5 
IIQ5 Pred -0.039*** -0.050** -0.074** -0.053*** -0.095*** 
  Sign: - (-4.123) (-2.094) (-2.088) (-4.471) (-6.855) 
Size5   -0.005** -0.009** -0.003 -0.000 -0.003* 
    (-2.309) (-2.224) (-0.965) (-0.048) (-1.661) 
PPE5   -0.030 -0.063 0.025 -0.039* -0.045** 
    (-1.387) (-1.245) (0.542) (-1.807) (-2.049) 
ΔPPE5   -0.096*** -0.095** -0.148*** -0.088*** -0.078*** 
    (-7.036) (-2.346) (-4.464) (-6.467) (-5.713) 
Leverage5   -0.089*** -0.011 -0.052 -0.089*** -0.109*** 
    (-3.688) (-0.164) (-1.342) (-3.817) (-4.606) 
Intangibles5   -0.000 -0.033 0.011 0.003 0.018 
    (-0.017) (-0.843) (0.376) (0.176) (0.935) 
R&D Expense5   -0.094** 0.001 -0.159** -0.103** -0.127*** 
    (-2.184) (0.006) (-2.065) (-2.472) (-3.030) 
NOL Dummy5   -0.028*** -0.009 -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.029*** 
    (-5.527) (-1.107) (-3.381) (-5.445) (-5.619) 
ΔNOL5   0.027 0.044 0.048 0.030 0.025 
    (1.384) (0.792) (1.307) (1.510) (1.268) 
Extraordinary Items5   1.856*** 2.618*** 3.553*** 1.852*** 1.883*** 
    (6.072) (3.783) (4.212) (6.053) (6.022) 
Foreign Income5   -0.091 -0.236 -0.376** -0.094 -0.040 
    (-0.818) (-1.279) (-2.190) (-0.838) (-0.361) 
FI Dummy5   0.010 0.015 0.017 0.009 0.008 
    (1.579) (1.252) (1.467) (1.459) (1.267) 
ROA5   -0.146*** 0.077 -0.115 -0.136*** -0.066 
    (-3.595) (0.869) (-1.466) (-3.328) (-1.600) 
MTB5   -0.003*** -0.003** -0.002 -0.002** -0.002** 
    (-2.808) (-2.116) (-1.136) (-2.453) (-2.142) 
Sales Growth5   -0.005*** -0.005 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
    (-5.564) (-1.568) (-3.035) (-5.497) (-5.305) 
Sales Volatility   0.032*** 0.020 0.089*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 
    (3.410) (0.807) (3.049) (3.511) (3.108) 
Age5   0.002 0.008 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
    (0.533) (1.264) (0.169) (-0.264) (0.545) 
Industry FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations   18,751 2,490 3,705 18,751 18,594 
Adj. R-squared   0.119 0.163 0.165 0.119 0.125 
This table presents the results of estimating equation 1 via OLS with Cash ETR5 as the dependent variable, where 
Cash ETR5 is measured as cash taxes paid over the current five year period scaled by pre-tax income adjusted for 
special items over the same period. Each column employs a different IIQ proxy (EA Speed, MF Acc, No MW, 
Analyst Following, AF Acc). IIQ proxies are ranked into quintiles each year and scaled to range from 0 (bottom 
quintile) to 1 (top quintile), and then are averaged over the current five year period. All other variables are defined in 
the appendix, and are measured over the current five year period.  Coefficients are presented with t-statistics based 
on firm-clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * denote significance at a 1, 5, and 10 percent level, for 
one-tailed tests where there are predictions and two-tailed tests otherwise. 
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TABLE 8: CHANGES IN INTERNAL INFORMATION QUALITY  




Proxy: ΔEA Speed ΔMF Acc ΔNo MW 
ΔAnalyst 
Foll ΔAF Acc 
 VARIABLES Dep Var: ΔCash ETR ΔCash ETR ΔCash ETR ΔCash ETR ΔCash ETR 
ΔIIQ Pred  -0.037*** -0.015** -0.014 -0.009 -0.045*** 
   Sign:  - (-4.227) (-1.952) (-1.039) (-0.912) (-8.390) 
Control Variables?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations   25,760 5,856 8,489 25,848 25,622 
Adj. R-squared   0.062 0.056 0.061 0.062 0.066 
 
This table presents the results of estimating a first-differenced version of equation 1 via OLS with ΔCash ETR as the 
dependent variable, where ΔCash ETR is measured as the change in the cash effective tax rate in the current year 
minus the cash effective tax rate in the previous year. Each column employs a change in a different ΔIIQ proxy 
(ΔEA Speed, ΔMF Acc, ΔNo MW, ΔAnalyst Following, ΔAF Acc). IIQ proxies are ranked into quintiles each year 
and scaled to range from 0 (bottom quintile) to 1 (top quintile), and are measured as the ranked value from this year 
minus the ranked value in the previous year. All other variables are defined in the appendix, and are also measured 
as the change in the variable from the prior year to the current year.  Coefficients are presented with t-statistics based 
on firm-clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * denote significance at a 1, 5, and 10 percent level, for 
one-tailed tests where there are predictions and two-tailed tests otherwise. 
 
